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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
BRADLEY RYAN THOMASSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

No. 43300
Gem County Case No.
CR-2014-204
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Thomasson failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion when it imposed consecutive sentences of 25, 25, 10, 10 and 14 years
determinate upon his convictions for First-Degree Arson, First-Degree Arson, Burglary,
Burglary and Grand Theft, respectively?
ARGUMENT
Thomasson Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
In 1990 Thomasson was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder. (PSI,

pp. 6-7.) Thomasson was 17 years of age at the time of the murders. (PSI, pp. 1, 6.)
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The district court imposed sentences of ten years to life.

(PSI, pp. 6-7.) He was

paroled on January 12, 2012. (PSI, p. 7.)
On April 27, 2013, Thomasson burglarized two churches, stealing a computer
from one church and a safe from the other. (PSI, pp. 3-6.) He set the churches on fire
to hide the evidence of his burglaries and thefts. (PSI, pp. 3-6.) He absconded from
parole at about this same time. (PSI, p. 66.)
The state charged Thomasson with two counts of first-degree arson, two counts
of burglary, one count of grand theft, and one count of petit theft. (R., pp. 72-74.) The
jury found him guilty as charged after a trial.

(R., pp. 437-39.)

The district court

imposed sentences of 25 years determinate on each arson count, 10 years determinate
on each burglary count, 14 years determinate for grand theft, and one year determinate
for petit theft, all consecutive to each other and consecutive to the remaining
indeterminate portion of his life sentences from his murder convictions. (R., pp. 45355.) Thomasson appealed (R., pp. 461-63) and, on appeal, asserts his sentences are
excessive (Appellant’s brief).
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard

considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
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abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001)
(citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
C.

Thomasson Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must

establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive.
State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To establish that the
sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of
protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Id.
The district court applied the correct legal standards, reviewed Thomasson’s
criminal history, and concluded that he should not have the opportunity for parole. (Tr.,
p. 977, L. 6 – p. 980, L. 12.) Given that Thomasson burglarized two churches, stole
from them, and then burned them to hide his crimes; that these are Thomasson’s third,
fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh felony convictions; and that he committed these crimes
within 16 months of being paroled from serving two life sentences for first-degree
murder, the sentences are more than amply supported by the record.
Thomasson argues that his sentences are a “fixed life sentence” imposed merely
as an impermissible “hedge against uncertainty.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) Review of
the record and application of the relevant legal standards show that Thomasson’s
argument is meritless.
“To impose a fixed life sentence requires a high degree of certainty that the
perpetrator could never be safely released back into society or that the nature of the
offense requires that the individual spend the rest of his life behind bars.” State v.
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Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 149, 191 P.3d 217, 227 (2008) (internal quotes omitted). “[A]
fixed life sentence may be deemed reasonable if the offense is so egregious that it
demands an exceptionally severe measure of retribution and deterrence, or if the
offender so utterly lacks rehabilitative potential that imprisonment until death is the only
feasible means of protecting society.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 939 P.2d
1372, 1373 (1997) (internal quotes omitted). Application of this standard shows the
sentences to be reasonable.
Thomasson’s claim that the district court simply imposed a hedge against
uncertainty instead of finding that Thomasson “so utterly lacks rehabilitative potential
that imprisonment until death is the only feasible means of protecting society” Jackson,
130 Idaho at 294, 939 P.2d at 1373, is false. The record shows that, because of two
prior first-degree murder convictions, Thomasson spent almost 22 years in prison.
(PSI, pp. 1, 6-7.)

Less than 16 months after being paroled, and at age 41, he

burglarized two churches, stole from them, burned them to hide his crimes, and
absconded from parole. (PSI, pp. 1, 3-7.) The district court specifically considered this
history and the nature of the current offenses. (Tr., p. 978, L. 17 – p. 979, L. 6.) The
district court reasonably concluded that although the chances of parole regardless of its
sentence were “slim to none,” protection of the community required that no chance of
parole be afforded by the sentences. (Tr., p. 979, Ls. 7-15.) Sentences that required
Thomasson to “spend the rest of [his] life in prison,” the district court specifically found,
were “the only way that society is protected.” (Tr., p. 980, Ls. 9-12.) Because the
district court specifically found that sentences foreclosing the possibility of parole were
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required to protect society, and the record supports that finding, Thomasson has shown
no abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district
court.
DATED this 17th day of March, 2016.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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